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PRUDENCE, BENEVOLENCE, AND NEGLIGENCE:
VIRTUE ETHICS AND TORT LAW

Heidi Li Feldman 1431

In this Article, Feldman aims to remedy a lapse in tort scholarship on the negligence standard in American tort law. Tort scholars have devoted much attention to
the meaning of reasonableness in tort law's reasonable person standard. But the full
standard, upon which the jury is instructed, emphasizes that the fictitious reasonable
person contemplated by tort law possesses certain virtues, specifically prudence and
due carefulness. Drawing on the virtue ethics tradition in moral philosophy, Feldman
explains the relationship between human flourishing or well-being and the virtues.
She focuses on prudence and due care and argues that these traits dispose their possessor to be sensitive to certain features of situations and to respond to those features
specifically. Feldman argues that in a negligence action, the jury performs the function of a thought-experimenter, seeking to ascertain how a reasonable person possessed of prudence and due care would act in the situation that confronted the actual
defendant. The result of the jury's experiment constitutes a normative expectation,
offering guidance to those confronting similar situations. This demonstrates that a
virtue-based standard can yield particular prescriptions for conduct. Feldman concludes the Article by addressing two possible worries about the negligence standard
conceived in virtue-theoretic terms: a worry that it grants the jury excessive normative
authority and the worry that the prescriptions generated by juries' thought experiments will not coincide with the dictates of a cost-benefit analysis undertaken from the
social viewpoint. She claims that democratic principles justify the jury's normative
authority in the tort context and argues that we have no noncircular reason to care if
juries strike a balance between freedom and action that does not maximize social
utility.
EMPATHY AND EVALUATIVE INQUIRY

Justin D'Arms 1467

Empathic mechanisms bring about emotional convergence between models and
observers. Such convergence is valuable not merely for motivating prosocial behavior,
but also as a tool for evaluative inquiry. Recent scholarship on emotions has emphasized their role in revealing or constituting various realms of value. In light of such
suggestions, this Article explores the mechanisms and consequences of empathy. It is
argued that, by allowing one to "try on" new emotional takes on the world, empathy
can expand a person's evaluative perspective in important ways. This can render an

agent susceptible to forms of evaluative experience and ultimately evaluative knowledge that might otherwise be unavailable to her.
RETRIBUTION AND REDEMPTION IN THE
OPERATION OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Elizabeth Rapaport 1501

Rapaport offers a critique of the contemporary retributivist approach to executive clemency and seeks to stimulate reappraisal and development of what she calls
the "redemptive" perspective. The retributivist view of clemency and of criminal justice generally is reductionist: Retributivists take both the justification and measure of
punishment to be just desert. A richer account of clemency recognizes that criminal
justice has a complex set of goals. Rapaport argues that, while there is clearly a sense
in which justice and clemency-as-retributively-undeserved-lenity are antithetical, an
account of criminal justice rich enough to reflect our traditions and practices prior to
the neo-retributive retreat finds a place for clemency-as-lenity.
THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL NORMS

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 1537

Legal scholars have expressed a growing interest in the power of social norms.
They now frequently argue that people obey the law even in the absence of legal
sanctions and order their lives effectively without the assistance of courts, legislatures,
and administrative agencies. This work promises to provide social reformers with inexpensive and effective ways of controlling antisocial behavior. Social psychologists,
however, have conducted decades of research on social norms indicating that it is difficult to manipulate behavior by manipulating social norms in a reliable manner.
Although social norms are important determinants of behavior, their influence can
also be quite ephemeral. This Article presents social psychological research demonstrating that social norms are both more powerful and less powerful than legal scholars have heretofore recognized.
TAKING MYTHS SERIOUSLY:
AN ESSAY FOR LAWYERS

Donald C. Langevoort 1569

A close connection exists between cognitive biases and the idea of "myth." People believe things with far more confidence than they should, which many psychologists and social theorists attribute to the need to suppress anxiety. This Essay explores
this idea within the world of lawyers and clients, especially in the business setting,
showing how personal mythologies can blunt ethical mandates and how storytelling
can sometimes help counteract the more pernicious forms of myth.
THE HIDDEN ECONOMY OF
THE UNCONSCIOUS

Anne C. Dailey

1599

Behavioral law and economics scholars rely on experimental psychology to help
explain nonrational market behavior. This Article argues that cognitive psychology
cannot provide an adequate account of irrationality because it downplays, or ignores
altogether, the role of unconscious emotions and motivations in human decisionmaking. Psychoanalysis is the only empirical psychology that explains how internal mechanisms of exchange come to affect real transactions in the world. What psychoanalysis
offers law and economics is in part an economic theory of mind, one that views the
roots of irrationality as residing in the unconscious mechanisms of transference both
within and among individuals.
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